Vandenberg v. Superior Court by Miller, Tiffany C.
Vandenberg v. Superior Court*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. judicial system widely applies the doctrine of collateral
estoppel as a form of issue preclusion. By precluding a party from relitigating
an issue conclusively decided prior to litigation, collateral estoppel helps
prevent harassing and vexatious litigation. 1 This doctrine is applicable only
.when a fact or issue in subsequent litigation is essentially identical to one
actually adjudicated and decided in a prior judgment.2
In its original application, mutuality was a requirement of collateral
estoppel. 3 This meant that parties to a previous suit could not relitigate the
authenticity of a question in a subsequent suit between them.4 Either of the
parties to the first suit, however, could relitigate the same question in a later
suit with a third party.5
The mutuality requirement of collateral estoppel was criticized as early
as the 1800s when commentators such as Jeremy Bentham felt that litigants
were entitled only to one day in court on any given issue.6 Following a
landmark 1942 decision by the Supreme Court of California, the federal
courts and many state courts abandoned the mutuality requirement.7 Justice
Traynor's opinion in Bernhard established three new requirements to
determine proper application of collateral estoppel, as follows: (1) "Was the
issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action in question?"; (2) "Was there a final judgment on the merits?"; and (3)
"Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?" 8 The U.S. Supreme Court also agreed to
abandon the mutuality requirement because "[in any lawsuit where a
* 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999).
1 See WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: TOOLS FOR
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 2 (1988).
2 See id. (citing Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir, 1965)).
3 See id. at 7-8.
4 See Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 Tax. L.
REV. 63, 70 (1988).
5 See id.
6 See id. at 72 (citing Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
7 See id. at 73(citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d
892, 895 (Cal. 1942)). The abolishment of the mutuality requirement applies only to
collateral estoppel (which deals with relitigation of specific issues); res judicata (dealing
with relitigation of an entire cause of action) still requires mutuality. See id.; see also
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.14, at 704 (1999).
8 Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895.
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defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete
defense on the merits to a claim [that] the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost
in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources." 9
Once again, the Supreme Court of California has faced the application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel, this time in the context of an arbitration
judgment. In Vandenberg v. Superior Court,10 the court, rejecting the
approach of several other states, held that a private arbitration award does not
have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect without an express agreement by
the arbitration parties.
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
From 1958 to 1988, Vandenberg Motors ("Vandenberg")" leased
property from Eugene and Kathryn Boyd.12 The Vandenberg business and
leasehold ended in 1988, at which time the Boyds planned to sell the land.13
In preparing the land for sale, the Boyds discovered underground waste oil
storage tanks. Additional testing revealed contaminants in the soil and
groundwater beneath the property. 14 After discovering the contaminants, the
Boyds filed suit against Vandenberg, alleging that the installation and
operation of the waste oil tanks caused the petroleum contamination. 15 The
Boyds' causes of action included "breach of contract, breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, public and private nuisance, negligence, waste,
trespass, strict liability, equitable indemnity, declaratory relief, and injunctive
relief."16
Several insurance policies held by Vandenberg provided coverage for
sums Vandenberg was obligated by law to pay because of property
damage. 17 However, some policies contained pollution exclusion language.
Two of the insurers, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G)
9 Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
10 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999).
11 Vandenberg Motors collectively includes four individuals (John B. Vandenberg,
Jeanette B. Vandenberg, James A. Keil, and Bonnie J. Keil), a general partnership known
as Vandenberg & Keil, and Vandenberg Motors, Inc. See id. at 234 n.3.
12 See id. at 234.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 234.
15 See id. at 234-35.
16 Id. at 235.
17 See id. The Court named six of Vandenberg's insurance providers, but suggests
there are others. However, the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company and the
Centennial Insurance Company are the two insurers relevant to the case. See id.
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and Centennial Insurance Company (Centennial), had policies that did not
cover property damage caused by pollutants or contaminants except a
"sudden and accidental discharge. ' 18 Vandenberg turned over defense of the
Boyd action to its insurers, but only USF&G agreed to provide a defense. 19
Judicially supervised settlement proceedings were held, and USF&G, the
Boyds, and Vandenberg agreed that the parties would contribute jointly to
the "investigation and renediation of the contamination." 20 As part of the
agreement, USF&G would bear the brunt of the cleanup cost, the Boyds
would release USF&G from any claims, and Vandenberg would release the
insurer from the claims of bad faith, contract breach, and extracontractual
damages. 21 Boyd also released all claims against Vandenberg in exchange for
a single breach of lease claim, which was to be resolved through arbitration
or trial.22 One of Vandenberg's conditions to the settlement agreement was
that the arbitration would be binding.23
The arbitration commenced with USF&G defehding for Vandenberg. 24
The parties conducted formal discovery and were represented by counsel,
who presented "extensive evidence, briefings, and argument. 25 An
arbitrator, a retired federal judge, ruled for the Boyds, finding that the
contamination resulted primarily from Vandenberg's improper installation,
use, and maintenance of the underground tanks.26 The arbitrator also ruled
that the contamination was not "sudden and accidental. 27 The Boyds were
awarded more than $4 million, and a California superior court confirmed the
judgment. 28
Vandenberg thereafter filed for indemnification for the $4 million award
from his insurers. The insurers rejected the indemnification request,29 and
Vandenberg filed suit against its insurer for "failure to defend, settle, or
18 Id.
19 See id.
20 Id.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24See id.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27Id.
28 See id. at 235.
29 See id. The insurance policy only provided indemnification for "sudden and
accidental" contamination. Because the arbitrator determined the contamination had not
been "sudden and accidental," the insurers refused to pay. Id. at 235-36.
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indemnify. ' '30 The lower court granted summary judgment against
Vandenberg, finding that the arbitrator had already decided the issue of
causation against Vandenberg. 31 Vandenberg then petitioned for preemptory
writs of mandate, which were issued by the court of appeals. 32 The Supreme
Court of California, upholding the court of appeals, held that the private
arbitration award, even if judicially confirmed, did not have nonmutual
collateral estoppel effect unless the parties had agreed to such.33 The court
also decided an alternate issue, holding that the commercial general liability
policy, which provided coverage for any sums that Vandenberg was "legally
obligated to pay as damages," did not "necessarily preclude []coverage for
losses pleaded as contractual damages."'34 An insurer should decide coverage
based on the nature of the property, injury, and risk that caused the injury in
light of the particular provisions of each applicable policy.35
Ill. APPLICATION OF NONMUTUAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO
ARBITRATION DECISIONS
The holding in Vandenberg goes against the growing trend of states that
apply nonmutual collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions.
The predominant view is that unless the arbitral parties agreed otherwise, a
judicially confirmed private arbitration award will have collateral estoppel
effect, even in favor of nonparties to the arbitration, if the arbitrator actually
and necessarily decided the issue sought to be foreclosed and the party
against whom estoppel is invoked had full incentive and opportunity to
litigate the matter.36
This is the approach taken by New York courts, including in Clemens v.
Apple.37 In that case, plaintiff Clemens, a man with Alzheimer' s disease, was
in an automobile accident and sued the other driver, Apple, alleging the
3 0 Id. at 235.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 236.
33 See id. at 243.
34 Id. at 243, 246.
35 See id. at 245-46.
3 6 1d. at 240.
37 477 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). For other New York state examples,
see generally In re American Ins. Co. & Messinger, 371 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1977), and
Kerins v. Prudential Property & Cas., 585 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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accident had aggravated a herniated disc condition.38 In a prior arbitration
against his insurer, however, Clemens had lost a benefits claim based on a
finding that there was a lack of causal connection between the accident and
the disc condition.39 Apple convinced the court that Clemens was collaterally
estopped against suing Apple for the same injury, which the arbitrator
already had determined the accident did not cause.40
The Clemens decision, unlike Vandenberg, reasoned that the lack of an
agreement by the arbitration parties regarding collateral estoppel effects did
not justify "barring the application of collateral estoppel." 41 Rather, "given
the fact that the negligence suit was pending at the time of the arbitration
proceeding, it was reasonably foreseeable that the arbitration decision would
impact on that suit."42 The Clemens court also emphasized that Clemens had
voluntarily submitted to arbitration. 43 Voluntary submission to the more
informal proceedings therefore could bind the parties fairly in a later
proceeding. 44
Other states, including Minnesota and Idaho, have applied similar
reasoning. For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho emphasized that if an
arbitration proceeding employs adjudicatory procedures and the parties to the
arbitration deem the outcome final, then courts should apply collateral
estoppel effects.45 The Idaho court reviewed the following five-factor test for
determining whether collateral estoppel is applicable:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the
present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in
the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior
38 See Clemens, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 775. Approximately two years after the accident,
"Clemens underwent surgery for removal of the herniated disc." Id. Clemens claimed that
the disc condition he suffered due to Alzheimer's disease was aggravated by the accident.
See id.
39 See id. After his insurer rejected his application for benefits coverage on the cost
of the surgery, Clemens had the option of either bringing a court action or proceeding to
arbitration. Clemens opted for arbitration, and an arbitration panel consisting of two
doctors rejected the benefits claim due to a lack of causal connection. See id.
40 See id. at 776.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id.
44See iL
45 See Western Indus. & Envtl. Servs. v. Kaldveer Assoc., 887 P.2d 1048, 1051
(Idaho 1994).
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litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party
or in privity with a party to the prior litigation. 46
The Supreme Court of Minnesota agreed that "an arbitration is meant to
be a final judgment of both law and fact. '4 7 Thus, collateral estoppel is
applicable to issues decided at arbitration if the following conditions are
satisfied: (1) a relitigated issue is identical to an issue decided at arbitration;
(2) the estopped party was either a party or in privity with a party to the
arbitration; (3) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be
heard on the adjudicated issue; and (4) there was a final judgment on the
merits. 48 The Minnesota court also found that a party waives the right to a
jury trial on a particular issue when the party voluntarily chooses to have that
issue decided with finality in arbitration. 49
In addition to the state court examples, the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments supports applying the same res judicata principles to arbitration as
are applied to traditional court judgments.50 Comments within the
Restatement suggest that arbitration is merely a specialized tribunal, usually
involving an impartial decisionmaker and a decision based on evidence, legal
argument, and the principles of finality. 51 So long as the procedure given to
the arbitration is not radically unfair, courts should afford arbitration a
conclusive and final effect, and it "should be accorded claim preclusive
effect unless a scheme of remedies requires that it be denied such effect. ' 52
IV. THE CALIFORNIAN APPROACH IN VANDENBERG
The Supreme Court of California decided to go against popular
application of collateral estoppel in the context of arbitration judgments. In
Vandenberg, the court noted that parties who choose arbitration should not
be treated as submitting to the same rules of finality that a typical court
46 Id. (citing Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 731 P.2d 171, 179 (Idaho 1987)).
47 Aufderhar, Jr. v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. 1990) (citing
Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1988)).
48 See id. at 650.
49 See id. at 653-54 ("[A] necessary inference arises that plaintiff waived his right to
a jury trial on that issue which was identical to a similar issue in the court case and on
which plaintiff had been afforded full opportunity to present all evidence ... to the
arbitrators, and, in fact, did so.").
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(1)-(2) (1982) ("[A] valid and
final award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to
the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.").
51 See id. cmt. a, b.
52 Id. cmt. b.
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judgment affords. Rather, by "choosing private arbitration, the parties
'evince [their] intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential
delays at the trial and appellate levels."' 53 Given the very nature of
arbitration, it is more appropriate "to insulate a private arbitral award from
close judicial scrutiny" because that is the parties' intent.54
The court rationalized the denial of nonmutual collateral estoppel to the
Vandenberg arbitration for a number of reasons. First, the court felt the
parties' silence in the arbitration agreement was not indicative of an implied
acceptance to be bound in a later judicial proceeding. "California's statutory
scheme nowhere specifies that" a private arbitration award may be binding in
this way.55 Rather, parties who submit to arbitration do so with an intent to
bypass the judicial system and with an understanding that judicial review will
be limited. 56 Thus, judicial interference with an arbitration judgment goes
against the expectations of the parties. If the parties are silent as to the
collateral estoppel effects of the arbitration decision, it is more logical to
assume that the parties expect the inherent separation between arbitration and
the judiciary to be honored.5 7 The Vandenberg decision states that collateral
estoppel effect should be applied based only on the parties' express
agreement for such, and "[t]he contractual nature of private arbitration
dictates that the scope and effect of an arbitral award must derive from the
parties' consent."58
53 Vandenburg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 238 (Cal. 1999) (alteration in
original) (quoting Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 903 (Cal. 1992)).
54 Id. at 239.
55 Id. The court notes that California's private arbitration statutes provide no
warning that an arbitrator's award could be used against them by third persons to resolve
different causes of action. See id. at 241-42 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 1287.4 (West 1982
& Supp. 2000)).
56 See id. at 242.
57 See id. at 239-40.
58 Id. at 242. By assuming that all arbitrations should be subject to nonmutual
collateral estoppel, one may be ignoring the fact that arbitration is a contractual animal.
Each arbitration is designed and implemented based on a specific agreement by the
parties. Of course, state law often spells out some parameters. The personalized nature of
arbitration means that each arbitration proceeding is different from the next. See SUSAN
M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA 49-
50 (1988). Thus, applying the general binding effect of collateral estoppel would
assumptively provide different levels of advantages and disadvantages in each arbitration
situation.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Second, although arbitration is often formal, one cannot classify the
formalities as typical to those given in a courtroom. 59 The whole point of
submitting to arbitration is that parties trade the typical "formalities of court
litigation for an expeditious, sometimes roughshod means of resolving their
dispute."60 Strict legal principles do not bind arbitrators, unlike judges and
juries. Rather, we permit arbitrators to make decisions based on principles of
equity and good conscience. 61 Thus, in reaching a decision arbitrators do not
use traditional judicial paths and should not be subject to traditional judicial
review.62 Likewise, a court should not give an arbitration judgment the same
collateral estoppel treatment that a litigation judgment receives.
Third, simply because an arbitral party voluntarily submits to an arbitral
decision does not mean the result should bind him in the same way as
courtroom litigation.63 Vandenberg outlines three reasons why denying
collateral estoppel effect to arbitration does not preserve judicial economy or
the integrity of the judicial system. For one, "because a private arbitrator's
award is outside the judicial system, denying the award collateral estoppel
effect has no adverse impact on judicial integrity. ' 64 Also, private arbitration
does not use a judge or courtroom, and thus later relitigation does not
implicate the issue of judicial economy through using judicial resources to
redecide the same issue.65 Finally, "when collateral estoppel is invoked by a
59 Arbitration has been described as "less formal than a trial but much more formal
than most everyday negotiating." CRAIG KUBEY, You DON'T ALWAYS NEED A LAWYER:
How TO RESOLVE YOUR LEGAL DISPUTES WITHOUT COSTLY LITIGATION 21 (1991).
60 Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 239.
61 See id. (citing Noguiero v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1195
(1988)).
62 See id.
63 See id. The court points out that it is unreasonable to expect parties to contemplate
all possible future controversies at the time they agree to arbitrate the current dispute.
Logically, most parties probably would not submit to arbitration if it required them to be
bound unendingly by the arbitration in future third-party disputes. Such a submission
almost always would burden the losing arbitration party. Thus, forcing such binding
effects goes against what the arbitral parties likely would have agreed to, if not silent. It
also "would chill, rather than promote, the voluntary use of the arbitral forum as an
efficient and informal alternative means of resolving particular controversies." Id. at 240.
64 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that some of the goals of res judicata
include the conservation of judicial resources (because courts are not forced to retry the
same issue twice), relief to parties from the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, and
preserving the prestige of the courts by avoiding inconsistent verdicts. See Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
65 See Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 240.
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nonparty.... the doctrine does not serve the policy against harassment by
vexatious litigation. '66
Finally, the Vandenberg decision rejects the case-by-case approach
applied in other jurisdictions. 67
By creating the possibility that some arbitral findings will [have] collateral
estoppel [effect], the case-by-case approach puts subtle but strong pressure
on the arbitration process to conform its perspective and methods to those
of litigation, in order to justify the confidence in its findings that collateral
estoppel represents. 6 8
At least one court has already applied the Vandenberg reasoning. The
Ninth Circuit, in citing Vandenberg, stated that "[j]udicial review would
defeat the 'very advantages that the parties to the arbitration sought to
achieve-an informal, expeditious, and efficient alternative means of dispute
resolution." 69 Because private arbitration judgments are not subject to
judicial review, they also should not be afforded collateral estoppel effect.70
V. CONCLUSION
If courts apply nonmutual collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions, the
arbitral parties will be bound by the particular findings if those issues ever
come up again in later litigation. As noted, some state courts believe that this
66 Id. Rather, when nonmutual collateral estoppel is applied, it gives nonparties what
has been termed the "option effect." Ratliff, supra note 4, at 71. This anomaly allows one
party to reap the benefits of litigation without accepting its risks. Thus, nonmutual
collateral estoppel does not merely prevent so-called "vexatious litigation," it gives
nonparties a windfall in that they may use prior decisions to their own advantage, even
though they put no risk into the original judgment. Jack Ratliff suggests that reinstating
the mutuality requirement would disable this "option effect." Id. at 71-72. As the
Vandenberg court points out, asserting collateral estoppel in this situation does not serve
to protect a party "who has already once prevailed" on the issue but rather provides a new
opponent with a "vicarious advantage from a litigation victory won by another."
Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 240.
67 As noted above, courts typically apply tests to determine if certain factors have
been met, including whether the arbitration proceeding provided a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the matter. See supra Part IlI.
68 Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to
Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REv. 29, 71 (1988), quoted in Vandenberg, 982
P.2d at 242 (alteration in original)..
69 Chiarello v. Samson, Nos. 98-16088, 98-16093, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28441, at
*6 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
70 See id. at *6-*7.
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is a fair outcome, reducing the opportunity to litigate a particular issue to a
single shot. Still, the Supreme Court of California questions whether it is
really fair to subject informal arbitration findings to the same rules as formal
courtroom decisions. Vandenberg asserts that arbitration parties must decide
expressly within the arbitration contract whether to be so bound by the
decision. If the arbitration parties are silent as to nonmutual collateral
estoppel, then Vandenberg states it would be unfair to subject the parties to
such a binding rule.
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